As for the future, some scholars have focused only on the rise of China, 8 whereas others have emphasised that the world is moving towards a greater degree of multipolarity 9 before the mid-century, with potentially four great powers, China, India, the European Union and the US, and a notable reduction in the number of middle powers compared with the past 50 years. 10 the US National Intelligence Council's report Global trends 2030: Alternative worlds notes that one of the four most important megatrends globally is the diffusion of power, which is happening both across states (from west to East, in particular),
and from states to networks, non-state actors and other international regimes. the global realignment identified in this report can already be seen just three years after its publication.
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China has risen and its economy was recently re-estimated to be larger than that of the US in purchasing-parity terms.
within this broader picture of global power redistribution, Africa remains largely at the margins. the total size of the African economy is expected to increase by 29% from $5.3 trillion to $18 trillion, but by 2040 its share of the global economy will only increase from 5.1% to 7.2%.
Within the broader picture of global power redistribution, Africa remains largely at the margins on the other hand, Africa's demographic share is growing rapidly. In 2014 the total African population was estimated at 1.1 billion people, or 15.6% of the global population. By 2040
Africa is expected to have a population of 2.0 billion people, constituting 21.8% of the global population. to put this figure into perspective, by 2040 Africa's population will have increased by 820 million people. this is more than the total current population of the European Union (over 500 million people -a figure that will remain largely unchanged to 2040). In the absence of an agricultural revolution that could exploit the massive potential of the associated workforce, Africa will remain largely dependent on food imports to feed its growing population.
Using the measure of power explored in this paper (see Box China and the US represent about 12% and 18% of global power, respectively. In 2015, the combined relative power of Africa is larger than that of Japan, russia or India but less than that of the US, China or the European Union (EU). As for the future, the total relative power of Africa is likely to surpass that of the declining EU and US by 2040.
mANUFACtUrING GrowtH wILL CoNtINUE to GrAvItAtE towArDS tHE FrEE-trADE rEGIoN tHAt HAS tHE LowESt CoSt oF LABoUr AND GrEAtESt DomEStIC StABILIty Although the combined capabilities of Africa's 55 countries total about 9% of global power today and are forecast to rise to over 11% by 2040, Africa is obviously neither a sovereign country (but composed of 55 sovereign countries) nor a union of states with any kind of supranational provisions. And even with a great expansion of regional and continental integration, the expression of a unified African foreign policy 12 is highly unlikely. with the potential exception of Nigeria, African countries will remain what have been termed 'minor powers' 13 and this has implications on how Africa will influence issues of global governance.
yet, some argue that African states will nevertheless continue to gain greater agency 14 in terms of shaping their own future in a complex and interconnected world. vickers, for example, observes that:
...notwithstanding […] structural constraints on African governments' bargaining power, it is significant that African countries in their individual and collective capacities are increasingly active, assertive and confident players on the world stage, influencing international negotiations in areas ranging from multilateral trade to climate change. 15 In general, though, the present authors make the case that only very deep economic and political integration complemented by much more rapid and sustained economic growth in Africa could offset its limited role in shaping global governance.
As Africa is the next regional emerging market after India, manufacturing and services are expected to expand rapidly in the continent -although much of this growth will initially be at the lower end of the value-add curve (albeit higher than the current value derived from commodity exports). manufacturing growth will continue to gravitate towards the free-trade region that has the lowest cost of labour and greatest domestic stability. this will increasingly include sub-Saharan Africa. one potentially major determinant of higher future growth rates will be the political and economic integration of current markets -the creation of regional economic communities with common currencies, freedom of movement of labour and capital across borders, and common import and export tariffs.
Population growth could also act as an important driver of economic growth. Earlier work by the African Futures Project 16 has documented demographic growth in west and East Africa, 17 where population sizes will expand more rapidly than in northern and southern Africa. Central Africa will also experience large increases in population, but from a much lower base. It is expected that the populations of northern and southern
Africa will have income levels that are three to four times higher per person than in East and central Africa over the forecast horizon, and that west Africa will slowly catch up with the two richer regions. Crises. Currently, nine of the sixteen global peacekeeping operations are sited in Africa and it is reasonable to expect that the mother continent will remain the largest domain for international peace operations in the medium term.
Drawing on various public datasets on instability and violence, the authors analysed the increase in armed conflict and social instability in Africa that started in 2010. the nature of violence in Africa has also changed in recent years. today armed conflict between governments and armed militias is still widespread, and battles between armed groups remain the primary cause of conflict-related fatalities in Africa. 27 However, social turbulence, violence around elections and terrorism has increased.
making forecasts of future conflict trends in Africa is complicated by a toxic mixture of poverty and inequality, religious radicalisation, poor governance, and high levels of corruption, which are offset by the countervailing effects of increased government capacity, spending and effectiveness, and positive growth prospects for Africa. In fact, the process of development in itself is messy and can fuel or accentuate imbalances in social systems and in the economic, political or social sphere. 28 In the case of the Arab Spring, for example, it was not generally low levels of development that drove those states to tipping points: the disequilibrium between relatively high levels of human development and low access to political and economic systems led to the instability. • Algeria and Ethiopia can both be seen as strong states with high military capacity, a rebel presence, but relatively low violence overall, and a fairly fractured opposition that seems unable or unwilling to capitalise on the situation to its advantage (unlike in Nigeria).
• South Africa's conflict profile is dominated by internal party struggles (as militia and rioting behaviour indicates), and high levels of popular protest, which is occasionally violent, although the rates of peaceful protest attest to an otherwise fairly coherent democracy. Peace and development in South Africa are compromised by high levels of criminal, rather than political, violence.
• Egypt is a country in transition, with high violence and multiple, discrete threats directed against the state. over the past two years, there has been a clear shift towards repression of the opposition, although the opposition remains more potent than in Algeria and Ethiopia.
• Nigeria is a much more fractured regime, with a more vocal opposition. In spite of a recent tendency to focus on the threat of Boko Haram in the north-east, the country is affected by multiple, discrete, albeit nascent or dormant threats, as part of a wider political economy of violence, in which violence is repeatedly used by elites seeking to renegotiate access to resources, power and representation. this is the case, for example, in the Niger Delta, the middle Belt and the north-east. the IIAG scores for the Big Five states are as follows:
• South Africa is fourth in the continental ranking and highest of the Big Five, with an overall score of 73.3 out of 100, having improved its score by 0.5% over the past five years.
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• Algeria ranks 20th, with an overall score of 54.4, having improved by 1.4% over the past five years. Algeria's score corresponds with the African average; Egypt, Ethiopia and Nigeria all score below the average.
• Egypt ranks 26th, with a score of 51.1, having experienced a decline of 8% over the past five years.
• Ethiopia ranks 32nd, with a score of 48.5, having improved by 2.1% over the past five years.
• Nigeria is 37th, with a score of 45.8, having improved by 0.6% over the past five years. the picture that emerges, then, from these rankings is that South Africa and Nigeria have been relatively stagnant in terms of governance, there is a trend towards improved governance in Ethiopia and Algeria (at least to some extent), and Egypt has been regressive. the four conceptual subcategories of governance for the IIAG are safety and rule of law; participation and human rights; sustainable economic opportunity; and human development.
the radial graph in Figure 6 compares the results of the Big Five in each of these subcategories. Nigeria scores the worst in three of the four dimensions, although, interestingly, it ranks second (after South Africa) on participation and human rights.
South Africa ranks highest in all dimensions.
there is likely to be a positive correlation between the score for participation and human rights, and the regime types of the Big Five. In other words, the more democratic the state, the higher the scores for participation and human rights. Contrary to the fairly balanced picture of South Africa's governance level, with its high scores in all four dimensions, the situation with some of the other countries is skewed.
Governance scores for human development are relatively high in Algeria and Egypt, for example, but the lack of capacity in all other dimensions of governance, particularly participation and human rights, is evident. this indicates a major imbalance that makes both countries potentially vulnerable to incidences of abrupt sociopolitical change, such as occurred during the Arab Spring. In those countries, relatively high levels of human development, including education, clash with generally low levels of access to political systems.
Ethiopia scores even worse on participation and human rights. 42 However, because levels of human and economic development are much lower there, while state capacity for repression is high, instability is less likely to occur -a situation that may change in the medium-to longer-term future if Ethiopia were to maintain high levels of growth and development, which appears a likely scenario.
Nigeria does not show any obvious imbalances in its social systems but the country generally scores low in all the sub-indicators, with the exception of participation and human rights. Nigeria's governance deficit is particularly evident in terms of safety and rule of law, and sustainable economic opportunity. these are due to high levels of conflict, as described in the previous section, and high levels of poverty, both in absolute and in relative terms. Using gender empowerment, South Africa also ranks first, followed at a significant distance by Ethiopia, Algeria, Egypt and lastly Nigeria. All countries are expected to experience modest improvements over the coming decades. 43 the objective of this section has been to provide a framework for the subsequent discussion about power in terms of the capabilities of the Big Five. the next section looks at how these states are likely to evolve up to the 2040 time horizon, in line with the authors' hypothesis that governance can act as a mediating factor when it comes to the projection of power on the basis of a country's capabilities and potential.
Capabilities of the Big Five
Using the HHmI, Figure 5 In 2014 only six African countries had economies with a GDP larger than $100 billion (in real market exchange rates):
• Nigeria ($536 billion)
• South Africa ($454 billion)
• Egypt ($263 billion)
• Algeria ($233 billion)
• Angola ($126 billion)
• Morocco ($116 billion)
Ethiopia was the 11th largest economy in Africa, with a GDP of $43 billion. But, although Ethiopia's GDP was 12 times smaller than that of Nigeria in 2014, at the end of the forecast period in question it is estimated that Ethiopia will be the sixth largest economy in Africa and only eight times smaller than that of Nigeria (see Figure 6 ). this reflects faster rates of convergence. this upward trend has to do with lower general levels of development, which are associated with higher fertility rates. • The number of embassies a country has in the world.
• The number of memberships of international organisations, weighted by importance of these organisations.
• The number of treaties held by the UN secretary-general signed or ratified by a country, weighted by treaty importance.
46 Figure 9 shows that Egypt has traditionally dominated this category of foreign-policy power projection, followed more recently by South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, and Ethiopia.
the increase in the level of South Africa's diplomatic engagement after the end of apartheid is clearly evident in Figure 9 , illustrating the country's successful reintegration into international affairs over the last 20 years.
EGyPt IS tHE AFrICAN CoUNtry wItH tHE moSt EmBASSIES ABroAD Egypt has traditionally dominated when it comes to diplomatic engagements Ethiopia's Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy makes it clear that foreign policy is subservient to Ethiopia's internal policies, which prioritise economic development, stability and democratic governance. 48 Ethiopia has successfully dominated the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), through which it pursues its regional objectives. And although Ethiopia chaired the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) for almost eight years and the AU Commission's headquarters is in the Ethiopian capital, it is perhaps no surprise that the country has the fewest embassies of the Big Five, and is a signatory to fewer international treaties and a member of fewer international organisations than the others in the group.
Military spending
the size and quality of a country's military force is a traditional indicator for measuring national power. For its part, and beyond its various internal challenges, Ethiopia has a frozen conflict with Eritrea, insurgency in Somalia and war in neighbouring Sudan/South Sudan to contend with in the region.
Since the end of apartheid, South Africa is the only country in the group at peace with its region, which is reflected in the dramatic decline in defence expenditure since 1994. From potential to power projection in Africa the analysis thus far has looked at African power in the global and African contexts, and at the Big Five in terms of governance, with a focus on domestic security, and finally at the economic, demographic, diplomatic, military and technological capabilities that are included in the HHmI power index. the point has been reiterated that power is as much about potential as about projection or concrete outcomes, and that capabilities need to be translated into power projection via national processes.
Assessing a country's influence is as complex as measuring its capabilities. Indicators for a country's influence can only be proxies, and any analysis is subject to a considerable degree of subjectivity. two potential ways of assessing influence in the foreign-policy domain in the African context may be, firstly, to look at a country's commitment to peacekeeping missions, and, secondly, its membership in the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC). Given the heavy conflict burden Africa is facing, and is likely to be subject to in the future, a country's commitment to contributing to peace and security as a regional or international public good is an important indicator of its leadership qualities, ambitions and influence. It also tells us something about the capacity of a country to formulate and implement a coherent foreign policy. today, democratic South Africa is certainly more influential globally than its previous regime could have ever imagined. It is therefore questionable whether, in a context of stagnant or even declining capabilities and a lack of credible leadership, South
Africa will be able to continue to punch above its weight in the medium-term future.
It is questionable whether South Africa will be able to continue to punch above its weight in the future Nigeria is the only African country that has the potential to emerge as a globally significant player Nigeria, on the other hand, is the only African country that in terms of capabilities has the potential to emerge as a globally significant player. However, it has been punching well below its weight. Despite being by far the largest economy in Africa, an advantage that will increase, successive Nigerian presidents have wrestled with internal instability, high levels of corruption and a political economy of violence. Nigeria has not managed to secure the transition to a sustained, inclusive political-economic system. However, given South Africa's decreasing capabilities, its inconsistencies with regard to its foreign policy as well as legitimacy problems it faces on the continent, the authors conclude that although the country will remain an important player it is likely that its influence in the affairs of other countries will wane. this is despite its significant advantage in terms of its membership of BrICS and the G20, and its strategic partnership with the EU.
Global measures of power, such as the HHmI, are useful to measure the capabilities of states and their power potential.
However, they are not designed to measure actual power projection. more comparative research should be conducted to achieve a better understanding of the relationship between governance and domestic instability in particular and foreignpolicy projection, especially at relatively low levels of capability, which is the case for much of Africa. In any case, it is important to acknowledge that power projection in Africa occurs in a context of ongoing processes of state consolidation and significant governance gaps, including fairly high levels of violent conflict.
In addition, this paper has not explicitly treated the various impacts of increased regional cooperation on the ability of Africa's states to project power. Increasing the density of connections within and across regional Economic
Communities could, in turn, change the ability of African states to influence the international system. this deepening of integration is a potential game-changer that should also be considered in future research.
In the case of Nigeria, it seems reasonable to argue that the governance deficit compromises its power projection but whether this is mainly attributable to high levels of internal violent conflict or the lack of state capacity and/or inclusiveness is difficult to evaluate without embarking on a more granular analysis.
the aftermath of the Arab Spring as well as a troubled immediate neighbourhood additionally detract from external power projection.
the distribution of relative power in Africa is such that it is likely that various countries will continue to fulfil the role of subregional leaders. only Nigeria has the potential to be a hegemonic leader in Africa with global significance. But, as mentioned already, such a development would require a comprehensive change in its current domestic stability, governance capacity and political leadership.
Annexure: the hillebrand-herman-Moyer index 30 Email correspondence from C Dowd with J Cilliers, 6 January 2015.
31 Email correspondence from C Dowd with J Schünemann, 21 october
2014.
32 Domestic security is not a capability and has an indeterminate relationship with the ability of states to project power from a macro, cross-national perspective. It could be treated as an intervening variable when it comes to translating capabilities in terms of states' potential to project power.
33 Historically, states have also engaged in wars that have been, at least partially, aimed at distracting attention from domestic problems, such as instability. more research should be directed at understanding the relationship between domestic instability and foreign-policy projection, especially at relatively low levels of capability endowment. 53 this provides a proxy for economic-technological development by combining technological advancement (i.e. higher levels of GDP per capita at PPP) with overall size of national economic output (GDP at mEr).
54 In December 2014 Ethiopia announced that it was prepared to boost its troop levels in Somalia to replace a contingent of 850 soldiers from Sierra Leone, which had been forced to withdraw its forces from the AU mission in Somalia because of Ebola. 
